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We document a sharp reversal in electoral participation between the North and the South of Italy after 
the 1912 enfranchisement which extended voting rights from a limited élite to (almost) all adult males. 
When voting was restricted to the élite, electoral turnout was higher in the South but falls significantly 
below that in the North after the enfranchisement. Furthermore the new gap is never bridged over the 
following century and participation remains lower in the South despite the enrichment of democratic 
institutions and further extension of voting rights to the female population during the post war 
democratic republic. This pattern in the data is consistent with a simple model where individuals’ voting 
in political elections is affected by private benefits and by civic duty, only elites can grab private benefits 
from participation in politics and civic culture differs across communities. We also find that extension of 
voting rights to non-elites results in a significant transfer of power to their political organizations only 
among populations with a high sense of civic duties. Together with the very persistent gap in 
participation between North and South our findings suggest that democratization – a process of 
concession of democratic rights – can benefit non-elites only when the latter have already a high sense of 
civic capital and is unlikely to be a viable avenue for inducing norms of civic behavior. 
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Quaderni di Storia Economica – n. 23 – Banca d’Italia – October 2011  “If the democratic model of the participatory state is to 
develop in these new nations it will require more than the 
formal institutions of democracy – universal suffrage, the 
political party, the elective legislature. These in fact are 
also part of the totalitarian participation pattern, in a 
formal if not functional sense.  A democratic form of 
participatory political system requires as well a political 
culture consistent with it.” 
Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba, “The Civic 
Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations”  
1.  Introduction 
In an attempt to explain why differences in economic success across countries tend to 
persist over the course of centuries, during the past decade a new literature has drawn attention 
to the role of institutions in affecting economic performance and its persistence. One strand of 
literature led by the work of Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2005), has focused on the role of formal 
institutions.    Protection of property rights and limitations on the power of the executive, which 
– they claim – are essential to the development process, are built into the formal institution of a 
county and tend to persist over the centuries. A parallel strand, linked to La Porta et al. (1998), 
has emphasized the importance of legal traditions and the beneficial effects of British legal 
origin for the development of financial markets and ultimately for economic development. 
Dismantling dysfunctional formal institutions and replacing them with more economy-friendly 
ones, such as institutions and political processes that constrain the power of the executive, may 
be seen as a recipe for economic development.  One important issue is then what makes an 
institutional reform successful.  
A second strand of literature has called attention to the role of informal institutions, in 
particular the prevalence of cultural values of cooperative behavior and beliefs of mutual trust 
(Tabellini (2008b), Guiso et al. (2004, 2008c), Knack and Keefer (1997)) as well as values of 
fairness and individualism that instill a sense of self confidence in economic actors (Roland and 
Gorodnichenko, 2011a, 2011b) promoting achievement and innovation, in the tradition of Max 
Weber. Though it has been often been recognized that there could be complementarities and 
mutual influences between informal cultural norms and formal institutions (e.g. Tabellini 
(2008b)), these two strands have mostly moved in parallel. Yet, because cultural norms in 
general evolve slowly, more slowly than formal political or legal institutions (Williamson, 
2000), they may act as a constraint (Roland, 2004) and may affect the success of institutional 
reform and ultimately the type of institutions that actually prevail in a country. This was indeed 
the path-breaking contribution of Robert Putnam (1993) – showing that the performance of 
(formal) regional governments instituted in Italy in 1970 depended on the (informal) set of 
values and beliefs, i.e. the civic traditions, prevailing in each region. More recently, Murrel and 
Smith (2011) argue that the important institutional change brought about by the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 was made possible by the cultural changes that preceded formal institutional 
reforms.  
 
5In this paper we study how pre-existing cultural norms of civic behavior interact and 
affect the success of a major institutional reform – a democratization reform through the 
extension of voting rights from a restricted elite to a vast segment of the population. We draw 
data from the Italian 1912 enfranchisement which granted voting rights, once restricted to a 
minority based on income, to almost all adult males. We document that when voting was 
restricted to the élite participation in political elections was significantly and consistently higher 
in the Southern regions of the country, those that according to Putnam (1993) and, more 
recently, Guiso et al. (2004, 2010a, 2010b) are less endowed with civic capital. This feature 
itself may sound puzzling precisely because electoral turnout itself has been used to document 
the prevalence of norms of cooperation and civic engagement in the North of Italy. After the 
enfranchisement participation drops both in the North and in the South but much more in the 
latter than in the former so that there is a reversal.  
We argue that the pattern in the data is consistent with a simple model where voting in 
political elections is driven both by a private rent-seeking motive because political power can 
give rise to private benefits and by the diffusion of cultural norms of civic engagement that 
regard voting as a duty. Both motives are however heterogeneous within the population: access 
to political power and thus to private benefits is stronger for élites,  for instance because its 
members are better at pooling together the resources necessary to run for office; the importance 
of norms of civic participation differs across communities, strong in the North and weak in the 
South in obedience to the different civic traditions of the country initially documented by 
Putnam (1993), Banfield (1958) and, more recently, Guiso et al. (2010a). The model yields three 
predictions: first, participation in political elections is higher among élites because, ceteris 
paribus, they have both a social and a private motive for voting; second, the difference in 
participation between élite and non-élite voters decreases as the level of civicness increases 
because higher civicness strengthens the motive to participate of both élite and non-élite voters. 
Finally, these two results jointly imply that the enfranchisement of non-elites decreases voting 
turnout, the more so in less civic regions. The latter implication can easily rationalize the 
reversal in turnout between the North and the South of Italy following the franchise provided the 
difference in civic culture and/or in the relative size of elites vs. non-elites groups between the 
two areas is large enough.  
When we test these implications in our data we indeed find that electoral participation 
increases with social status and the relationship is steeper in communities with weaker civic 
culture. This is true both across individuals in social survey data from around year 2000 and 
across regions and electoral districts during the period between the Italian Unification and the 
advent of the Fascism (1861-1921). Most interestingly, the effect of the 1912 enfranchisement 
was to lower electoral turnout across the board but much more so in the low civicness regions: 
the drop is estimated to be between 14 and 20 percentage points larger in the Sorthern regions 
than in those in the North, and this effect is strong enough to reverse the higher political 
participation among the élites in the South. This result is not due to differences in civic capital 
reflecting differences in literacy or in economic development between Northern and Southern 
regions at time of enfranchisement, as it persists when we control for these factors. We also 
control for the relative size of the newly enfranchised non-elites, i.e. the “treatment intensity” of 
 
6enfranchisement, as approximated by the change in the electorate between the last pre-
enfranchisement and the first post-enfranchisement election. Indeed, differences along this 
dimension allow for a definitive empirical test of the model across electoral district within the 
same area. Consistently with our theoretical hypotheses, we find that voting turnout decreases 
with the size of non-elite groups both in Northern and Southern regions, but the slope is steeper 
in the latter relative to the former. 
Taken together this evidence is consistent with the view, first explored in the seminal and 
influential work of Almond and Verba (1963), that democratization to be effective requires that 
non-élites are ready and willing to exercise their voting rights when reforms grant them voting 
power: but this willingness and readiness depends in turns on whether a culture of civicness is 
already diffuse. To inquire this issue more directly we study how non-élites voted once they 
were granted democratic rights. Arguably, a democratization reform is successful if non-élites 
make an extensive use of these rights and if their votes are not captured by pre-existing élites 
but are used to strengthen their representativeness. That is, the reform is successful if it 
generates a substantial reallocation of political power away from élites. We find that following 
the enfranchisement, radical socialist and communist parties whose manifestos better reflected 
non-élites interests gained a significant consensus only in the civicness-rich Northern regions, 
where these parties reached almost 50% of total votes in the last elections before the fascism. 
Thus lack of civic culture threatens the success of democratization reforms both because fewer 
members of non-élites choose to use their voting power and because those who do so are 
strongly influenced by previous élites in their choices.
1 These findings add to parallel work by 
Larcinese (2011), who also investigates the effects of the 1912 enfranchisement on the electoral 
success of radical parties; later in this paper we will compare closely his and our findings.    
Overall, these results show that “de jure” concession of political rights taking place with 
the enfranchisement resulted at the time into a “de facto” re-allocation of political power only in 
the regions were the non-elites were willing to actually exert those rights. Did this difference 
disappeared over time as people voted repeatedly and possibly learned how to benefit from 
extended democratic rights? Did the formal democratic rights contributed to develop what  in 
the Almond and Verba's original study are the values and attitudes that sustain democratic 
institutions and which relate to the manner in which people within a polity view their 
relationships with others vis a vis their own interests? Put differently, did the 1912 
enfranchisement and the subsequent extension of voting rights to the whole population 
independently of gender after WWII bridge the gap in people civicness across regions of the 
country? A simple comparison of participation in political elections after WWII reveals a 
persistent gap between north and south, suggesting that democratization did not bridge the gap. 
                                                 
1 This pattern of behaviour is consistent and probably has contributed to shape Mosca (1939) sceptical view about 
the working of democracies where in any case a minority – the élite - ends up exercising the political power and 
controlling the majority thanks to its their greater organizational skills compared to non-elites. Lack of civic culture 
and thus of an understanding of the power of voting among non-élites can be seen as limited possession of   
“organizational skill”.       
 
 
7We further address comparing data on political elections and referenda turnout in referenda and 
political elections that took place after WWII. Since participation in political election may have 
also a private returns one should expect that it is higher in elections than in referenda, where 
voting carries no private benefits. However, if the civicness gap has been bridged we should 
find that this difference is the same between the North and the South of the country; on the other 
hand it still persists after decades of democratic rights the difference should be larger in the 
South than in the North. This is what the data suggest.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the historical 
background and present descriptive data about participation before and at time of 
enfranchisement, particularly the dramatic reversal in voting turnout between Northern and 
Southern electoral districts. Section 3 presents a streamlined model of voting decision and 
obtains predictions that are then confronted with the data in Sections 4 and  5. Section 6 
concludes. 
2.  Historical background 
2.1.  Pre-Unitarian institutions and civic traditions in Italy 
The unification of Italy in 1861 is the end of a long process of political disintegration into 
a large number of local powers and subsequent consolidation that started around the turns of the 
first millennium. This process was triggered by the collapse of the Carolingian Holy Roman 
Empire under which today Italy’s borders where unified. As the central power of the Empire fell 
a number of local powers emerged in order to fill in the vacuum. But the way this lack of power 
was filled in differs between the North and the South of Italy, and this difference is presumably 
at the origin of different civic traditions. Due to a number of historical contingences (the greater 
distance from the headquarters of the Emperor, the relative weak army of the Papal state) the 
South of Italy went conquered by the Normans which replaced the authority of the Emperor and 
established a highly hierarchical system of government that persisted, under different rulings, 
until Italy unifications for about 700 years. The North instead saw the affirmation of self-
government in cities, a feature that spread over Northern Central and  Western Europe 
(Reynolds, 1997; McKitterick, 2004) but whose development was particularly strong in 
Northern-Central Italy between 1100 and 1300.  Initially, in response to this vacuum of power 
and in order to manage the problems of common interest that the absenteeism of the Emperor 
was giving rise to (such as the maintenance of the city walls, the security of trade routes etc.), 
small groups of individuals in some cities joined forces and formed a “pact” to provide mutual 
help and collaboration to solve problems of common interest. In some cities (such as Genoa) 
this alliance involved the prominent families of the marine aristocracy who swore to work 
together to manage the city. From this seed, slowly more stable institutions started to develop. 
Initially was the creation of the consulate - a group of citizens that hold power for a year and 
were then replaced by another group, allowing a vast share of the populations to take charge of 
local government and acquire familiarity with political engagement. According to Milani the 
counsels for the administration of the city marks the most visible sign of the rise of the free city 
as an independent political body (Milani, 2005, p. 23). Over the course of the centuries these 
 
8initial institutions evolved into a formal “parliament” of elected members that allowed for a 
wider participation of the population in the decision making process. With these changes, the 
independent city-state was fully developed. It provided law and order, collected duties and tolls, 
took care of the walls that provided the basic protection to the citizens and was responsible for 
the maintenance and security of the roads, essential to guarantee trade, which was developing 
fast. In the mid-twelfth century a new word came into use to describe the independent town 
communities and their government: “commune”. As Reynolds (1997) notices “… its use in 
urban context may derive from communia, meaning common property: not only walls and 
streets but also cathedrals and churches were increasingly regarded as the responsibility and 
therefore the property of the local community. Their rights and liberties were also their common 
property which it was their responsibility to maintain (p. 170)”. Indeed, the word commune is a 
synonym for republic (res publica, i.e. common property) and is used with this meaning.  This 
sense of responsibility for the common good that citizens of independent towns developed and 
consolidated over two centuries of self-government is the “civicness” Putnam refers to which 
seems to characterize the North of the country and which was missing in the South because the 
hierarchical system of government suppressed any involvement of its populations with the 
management of power and the responsibility of government.   
Guiso et al. (2010) who provide a fuller account of the evolution of the free cities 
highlight three features of the free system of cities that has contributed to shaping its citizens 
political culture. First, the fact that the political entity was not identified with a single person 
ruling but rather with the whole community. Second, the ruler ruled in people name – that is the 
citizens were the source of power and thus its exercise required people consensus, though 
obviously prominent families mattered a lot. Third, the commune has a statute – similar to a 
constitution – enacted by an assembly and norms apply to the whole population independently 
of status, as it was in feudal times.  In sum, the commune grants legal protection to personal 
freedoms and thus limits the power of the executive, a feature that as argue by Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) is necessary for development. 
Finally, all these democratic characteristics of the free city and its emergence were not the 
result of unilateral concessions from the Emperors but rather a need for their citizens to provide 
local government services when the central authority of the Empire stopped to function.  We 
will come back to this point in the conclusions.   
The system of free cities evolved over time as cities fought against each other and the 
losers were conquered by the winners; with time, the elected bodies were slowly replaced by 
more centralized forms of government which evolved into the Signoria – the power of the lord. 
However, even these centralized powers retained many traits of the free cities, in particular the 
principle that power originated from people and was exercised in people’s name.  
When the process of unification started around the Vienna congress in 1815 Italy was a 
politically divided country with many kingdoms but with an even bigger culture divide – that 
between the South, at the time dominated by the Bourbons, and the North, where the civic 
culture created with free cities prevailed. In the South citizens were probably well characterized 
by what Almond and Verba defined “parochial” – politically sleepwalker, not involved, with 
 
9little or no knowledge or interest in the domestic political system;  in the North they were 
probably much closer to the “participant” type – people possessing a strong sense of influence, 
competence and confidence in understanding domestic political matters.  
Indeed, such differences were to be found in the civic capital endowments accumulated 
many years later, after the unification of the country. While in general information on civic 
traditions during the past centuries is not readily available, the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry 
and Commerce (1888) published regional statistics on the diffusion of voluntarily mutual aid 
societies and cooperatives, which is one of the main indicators of civic capital considered by 
Putnam (1993).
2 The picture in Figure 1, plotting the distribution of such organizations over 
total population across Italian regions, is consistent with the persistence of a huge cultural divide 
between north and south even decades after the unification of the country. 
2.2.  From the Unification to the enfranchisement of 1912 
The political fragmentation of the Italian peninsula finally came to an end during the 
second half of the 19
th century with the so-called Risorgimento (the “resurgence”). The 
nationalistic sentiments once confined to the narrow circle of intellectual elites spread out in the 
aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, which imposed the dominion of the Habsburgs over most 
of Northern Italy, while the Centre and South were still controlled by the Church State and the 
Bourbons, respectively. Following a number of crushed insurrections during the period between 
the 1820s and the European Revolutions of 1848, the strategic alliance with Napoleon III 
allowed the Kingdom of Sardinia (actually centered around the Savoy Monarchy in Piedmont) 
to overcome Austria in 1859, while the Bourbons were defeated with the expedition of Garibaldi 
in 1860. After the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861, another war against Austria for 
the north-eastern regions (1866) and the annexation of the remaining territories of the Church 
State (1870) completed the re-unification of the country.  
Throughout all these events (maybe with the exception of the Garibaldi expedition), the 
Risorgimento remained essentially an affair between the Savoy Monarchy and the urban high 
class, while large segments of the peasant population were at best skeptical (or even fiercely 
against) the process of unification. This influenced deeply the institutional architecture of the 
newborn Kingdom of Italy, which among other things restricted the suffrage in the elections for 
the National Parliament to wealthy adult males paying more than 40 Italian liras of taxes – about 
420 thousand individuals in 1861, or 1.9% of total population. In 1876 the income threshold was 
lowered from 40 to 19.80 liras (and the minimum age from 25 to 21), but it was not until 1912 
that the census criterion was finally abolished, at least for all individuals above 30; even for 
those aged between 21 and 30, compliance with compulsory military service became a sufficient 
condition for voting, extending the suffrage to almost 8.7 millions of individuals – about the 
entire adult male population.  
                                                 
2 Mutual aid societies were formed among urban artisans and craftsmen as an insurance device against accidents 
and economic hardship; similarly, cooperatives provided mutual assistance to their members, being them workers, 
producers or consumers. As argued by Putnam (1993), “mutual aid societies provided a locally organized, 
underfunded, self-help version of what the twentieth century would call the welfare state (…) represented collective 
solidarity in the face of the economic insecurities peculiar to the modern age”. 
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left; rather, it was a concession of the liberal coalition led by Giolitti. While its political 
motivations are subject to considerable speculation among historians, the reform was probably 
aimed at undermining the strength of the revolutionary movement amid increasing social unrest 
during the first decades of the XX century, consistently with the idea of Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2000) that the risk of a violent revolution may trigger political reforms.  
Whatever the reason for such concession, Figure 2 shows that the enfranchisement had 
immediate effects on electoral participation in Italy: 
i.  participation declined everywhere right after the enfranchisement; 
ii.  the drop was significantly larger in southern than in northern regions, leading to a 
reversal in voting turnout between the two areas before and after 1912. 
Importantly, the differential accumulated in the first decades of the XX century is not 
dissipated during the following one hundred years, characterized instead by a continuous 
divergence between northern and southern regions. 
In the next section we sketch a simple theoretical framework that provides an explanation 
for these patterns. By focusing on the differential dynamics between north and south we will 
instead neglect the long-run increase in voting turnout that characterizes both areas, which likely 
reflects a continuous process of accumulation of human capital as well as other aspects of 
economic development.  
3.  Theoretical framework 
Consider two types of individuals, the elite and the non-elite, that must decide whether or 
not to participate in politics (voting). The benefits of participation depend on two elements: the 
extraction of private rents and the social value associated with political participation.   
Private rents might include the returns to connection with politicians, favors obtained from 
supporting a candidate, the possibility of exercising political control and thus diverting 
resources in a desired direction, or the labor market premium enjoyed by former politicians, for 
instance because of their subsequent involvement in lobbying (see e.g. Fisman, 2001, Diermer et 
al., 2005, Ferguson and Voth, 2008, and Acemoglu et al. 2010). We assume that access to such 
rents increases with membership in elite groups; for example, belonging to the same restricted 
club may facilitate connections between appointed politicians and entrepreneurs. This is indeed 
the picture that emerges from the historical “portrait” of the American elites that is depicted by 
Mills (1945). 
Apart from private gains, political participation may be also motivated by a genuine desire 
to contribute to the functioning of the political system – what we call “civicness”. For instance, 
voting in elections allows for an ordered succession of powers in democratic systems: while in 
large elections the probability that each single voter is pivotal tends to zero, nevertheless the 
individual decision to vote contributes to the existence of an electoral result, in the same way as 
the participation of infinitesimal agents contribute to the existence of many other public goods. 
 
11We assume that the relative importance of private and social motives for participating in politics 
depends on the individual degree of civicness. Specifically, the utility of participating equals 
  () ( 1 ) US R c       (1) 
where  α is an index of civicness ranging between 0 and 1, S is the social value of 
participation in politics (the utility from exercising the duty of voting) and R are the private rents 
that descend from it; we assume R=0 for the non-elites.
3 Finally, the last term in (1) is the 
private cost of participating in politics, which may range from the “shoe-leather cost” of voting 
to the time and effort devoted to electoral campaigning. We assume that c is heterogeneously 
distributed across the population of agents according to the cumulative distribution F(c). 
Each individual participates in politics if and only if the benefits of doing so outweigh the 
cost, i.e.  
  () 0 ( 1 ) Uc S R     . (2) 
Therefore, the share of participants among the elites (E) and the non-elites (N) equals, 
respectively, ( ) ( (1 ) ) E FS R       and  ( ) ( ) N FS     so that the difference between the 
two groups is 
 () () () EN      . 
This simple model delivers three key results. From the fact that F(.) is monotonically 
increasing, it follows immediately that: 
R1.    On average, political participation is always higher among the elites than the 
non-elites,  
  () 0 , () 0 1 with for any        , (3) 
as the elites enjoy additional rents from political participation relative to the non-elites; 
R2.    The difference in participation between the two groups decreases with 
civicness,  
  () ( ) for any           ; (4) 
intuitively, more (less) civic elites attach less (more) importance to private rents relative 
to the social value of political participation.  
Finally, results R1 and R2 have immediate implications for the consequences of the 
enfranchisement of the non-elites:  
R3.   The enfranchisement of non-elites decreases voting turnout, the more so in less 
civic regions.  
                                                 
3 This stark assumption can be relaxed by letting R increase monotonically with some continuous index of social 
status. 
 
12Indeed, voting turnout V equals the voting participation of elites and non-elites weighted 
by the relative size of the two groups, 
 ()( 1 ) () () () NE E Vn n n              (5) 
where n is the share of non-elite agents in the electorate. As the latter increases from zero 
to some positive value after the enfranchisement, it follows directly from R1 that voting turnout 
must decrease; moreover, R2 implies that the drop should be larger in less civic regions. A 
corollary is that two areas can exhibit a reversal in voting turnout like that observed in Figure 2, 
provided that they differ enough in terms of culture and/or composition of the electorate. 
Specifically, for any two regions characterized by different levels of civicness and shares of 
non-elite voters, the reversal in sign before and after the enfranchisement requires that 
      () ( )0 ()( 1 ) () ( )( 1 ) ( ) EE N E N E nn n n                        
or  () ( )0 nn      
0
. A sufficient condition for the latter inequality to hold is that 
   0 nn   and  . We argued in the previous section that past institutional history 
favored a greater accumulation of civic capital in northern than in southern Italian regions; 
moreover, we will show in Section 5 that after the enfranchisement the share of non-elite voters 
in the electorate was smaller in the former than in the latter. Therefore, the predictions of this 
simple theoretical framework are consistent with the reversal in voting turnout between the two 
areas.  
Before moving to a throughout empirical analysis of the relationship between civicness, 
electorate’s composition and enfranchisement, we test confront the theoretical model 
(particularly predictions R1 and R2) with the individual-level evidence emerging from social 
survey data around year 2000. 
4.  Individual-level evidence 
Bringing the model to the data, we expect from equation (3) a positive relationship 
between socio-economic status and political participation; moreover, the result in equation (4) 
implies that the slope of such relationship should be steeper in less civic regions. This is exactly 
the picture that emerges from Figure 3, which plots average voting turnout and direct 
involvement in politics by socio-economic status and region of residence for a sample of Italian 
individuals interviewed during the fourth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). 
The WVS is a large survey program providing comparable evidence across countries 
about individual values, beliefs and attitudes along several dimensions, including politics. In 
particular, two questions in the survey asked, respectively, whether the respondent intended to 
vote in the following elections and whether (s)he was directly involved in politics, in the sense 
of being an appointed politician or government official or, at least, working for some party. 
While the question was asked in all editions of the survey, only in the fourth wave (years 1999-
 
132004) the respondent could explicitly choose not to vote for any party.
4 Finally, the WVS does 
also provide a 4-value index of individual socio-economic status. 
The graphs in Figure 3 convey two main results. First, political participation increases 
with socio-economic status, in line with prediction R1 of the theoretical model. Second, the 
differential between elites and non-elites is greater in Southern than in Northern regions. As 
long as civicness is lower in the former relative to the latter (as extensively documented by the 
literature discussed in Section 2.1), the difference in slopes is consistent with prediction R2 of 
the model.
5 
To quantify these findings, we regress each of the two measures of political participation 
on dummies for socio-economic status (individuals in the lowest class are the excluded 
category), distinguishing between northern and southern regions. Table 1 presents the results for 
voting in national elections. In line with the graphical evidence in Figure 3, the regression in 
column (1) shows that the probability of voting increases monotonically with socio-economic 
status, up to an additional 11 percentage points (one-third of the sample standard deviation) for 
people in the top social status group. The estimated difference is lower after controlling for 
region fixed effects and for a wide array of individual characteristics (column 2); however it 
remains sizeable (about 7 percentage points) for individuals highest in status.
6 In column (3) 
and (4) we estimate the same relationship separately for individuals residing in different areas of 
Italy. The estimates suggest that the slope is much steeper in southern regions, where electoral 
participation is 20 percentage points higher for individuals at the top of social status (as opposed 
to no significant effect in northern regions). The difference-in-differences specification in 
column (5) confirms that the differential increase is statistically significant only for individuals 
in the top class, consistent with the idea that private rents from political activity matter mostly 
for the elites.   
In  Table 2 we estimate the same linear probability model for active participation in 
politics, either through membership in some party or direct appointment in office. While this is 
possibly a more interesting outcome than the simple act of voting in elections, direct 
involvement in politics is also an extremely rare event, so that the numbers in small samples can 
be quite noisy; specifically, out of 1,368 individuals in our sample, 74 were members of some 
party, 43 actively worked for the party and only 6 were appointed in some political body. With 
                                                 
4 The WVS is currently in its fifth wave and results are fully available for the first four waves. In the first three 
waves the choice not to vote was lumped together with voting for other parties not listed in the questionnaire and/or 
missing values. 
5 Following Guiso et al. (2010), we excluded from the sample the island of Sardinia as its civic traditions are rather 
peculiar relative to any of the two groups.   
6 Individual controls include socio-demographic characteristics (age, age squared, gender and indicator variables for 
number of children and size of the town of residence) and other determinants of voting behavior, namely beliefs in 
democracy. Specifically, three questions in the WVS ask, respectively, whether the individual agrees or not (on a 4-
value scale) with the fact that “democracy may have problems but is better than any other form of government”; “in 
democracy the economic system runs badly”; it is better “having the army rule”. 
 
 
14these caveats in mind, the results are qualitatively very similar to those obtained for voting 
behavior, namely that political participation increases significantly with socio-economic status 
only in southern regions, particularly so for the members of the elite.  
Overall, the results in this section largely support our theoretical framework. For this 
reason, in the next section we adopt the same model to study the effects of the enfranchisement 
of non-elite voters in Italy. 
5.  Historical evidence 
The preliminary evidence presented in Section 2.2 documents stark changes in voting 
patterns across Italian regions before and after the enfranchisement of the male population in 
1912. In particular, the enfranchisement of the non-elites was followed by a decline in voting 
turnout, much more marked in the Southern regions. We next provide an econometric analysis 
of this event that is grounded in the theoretical framework discussed in Section 3, particularly 
result R3.  
The starting point of our analysis is equation (5), which relates voting turnout to the 
electoral participation and relative size of elite and non-elite groups in the electorate. The aim of 
the econometric exercise will be to identify how Δπ(α) -  the differential participation of elites 
and non-elites - varies across Italian regions and electoral districts characterized by a different 
degree of civicness α, and test whether these empirical patterns conform with the theoretical 
predictions of the model.  
The main source of historical electoral data in Italy is the Atlante Storico Elettorale 
d’Italia (2009), produced by the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo.
7 The data set provides information on 
voting turnout and electoral results for the whole Unitarian period. The geographical detail 
varies across different periods: regional figures are available for all 37 free elections held since 
1861 (plus 3 plebiscites during the fascist period), while district-level information covers the 
years 1861-1913 ; finally municipality-level data are available for the post-WWII period. 
5.1.  Regional analysis 
We focus here on the regional data for all 19 elections held during the period between the 
Unification and the advent of Fascism (1861-1921). While in principle aggregate electoral data 
do not allow us to observe the explanatory variable of main interest in equation (5), namely the 
share of non-elite individuals in the electorate, such a share necessarily decreased in all regions 
following the enfranchisement of 1912. We may thus exploit this common shock to identify 
Δπ(αr), the difference in voting turnout between elites and non-elites in region r. 
In practice, to estimate equation (5) we regress the voting turnout in region r and election t 
on an indicator variable Postt that takes value 1 for all elections after 1912, and absorb πE(αr) 
and other time invariant factors into a set of region fixed effects. In this way, the coefficient of 
Postt captures the (average) increase in the share of non-elites after the enfranchisement, Δπ(αr); 
                                                 
7 The Istituto Carlo Cattaneo is an Italian NGO that has been active for several decades in the collection and 
analysis of electoral data, see www.cattaneo.org.  
 
15letting the estimate vary across regions allows for a differential impact of the enfranchisement 
across regions characterized by different levels of civicness αr.
8 
The results are presented in Table 3. The first column quantifies the average drop after the 
enfranchisement in 4.6 percentage points, doubling to 9.3 when we include a linear trend 
(column 2) to control for the long-run increase in voting turnout that is evident from Figure 2. 
When we split the sample to distinguish between different areas of Italy (columns 3 and 4), the 
average drop is more than four times larger in Southern than in Northern regions. The 
difference-in-differences specification in column (5) confirms that the estimated coefficients are 
significantly different from each other and quantifies in almost 20 percentage points the 
additional drop in southern regions; such finding is unchanged as we include a full set of year-
specific fixed effects (column 6).  
One threat to the validity of the difference-in-differences approach is the presence of pre-
existing differential trends between the two groups of regions, which are indeed apparent from 
Figure 2. For this reason, in column (7) we allow for area-specific trends, so that the coefficient 
of the interaction Northr x Postt captures the post-enfranchisement differential drop net of the 
long-run differential trends in the voting turnout of the two groups of regions. Even under this 
very requiring specification, the effect of interest remains strongly statistically significant and of 
the same order of magnitude.  
In principle one cannot rule out the alternative explanation that cultural values themselves 
changed around the enfranchisement, determining a reversal in voting behavior even in the 
absence of any “civicness-mediated” effects of (changes in) electoral institutions. While this 
alternative explanation contrasts with a burgeoning literature on the slow moving and persistent 
nature of cultural traits (Guiso et al., 2010 for a review), we nevertheless explore this possibility 
by examining the persistence over time of an observable measure of civic traditions across 
Italian regions, namely the incidence of voluntary associations already described in Figure 1. 
Therefore, in Figure 4 we plot the same measure for years 2001 and 1883, as reported by the last 
available Census and by the Italian Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, 1885, 
respectively; the graph does not suggest any reversal in civicness between Northern and 
Southern.  
In the last two columns of Table 3 we re-estimate the same specification plugging the 
incidence of voluntary associations, as an observable measure of civicness, in place of the crude 
distinction between northern and southern regions. The results are qualitatively similar but 
lower in magnitude. In particular, the estimated coefficient in column (8) implies that an 
increase in the incidence of voluntary associations equal to the difference between north and 
south (0.3 and 0.9 associations per 10,000 inhabitants, respectively) is associated with a 
differential increase in voting turnout of 10% after the enfranchisement, which is lower than the 
                                                 
8 Notice that we are implicitly assuming that civicness is a region-specific characteristic that does not vary over the 
time period considered here (60 years). This is consistent with a burgeoning literature on the extreme persistence of 
cultural traits (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008, 2009, 2010), Nunn and Wantchekon (2009), Durante (2009) 
and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) for a review), as well as with additional evidence presented later in this 
section.  
 
16corresponding difference-in-differences between the two groups of regions (column 6). This 
suggests that the difference-in-differences estimates may partly capture variation along other 
dimensions in addition to civic traditions.  
We try to reduce the scope for spurious effects by inserting additional control variables on 
the right-hand side of the equation. Besides region-specific and year-specific factors, in fact, 
there are other possible determinants of voting turnout that differ between northern and southern 
regions and whose impact may vary under alternative electoral regimes. In particular, correlates 
of economic development such as human capital and industrialization are likely related to 
civicness and can also shape the response of non-elites to the enfranchisement.  
Therefore, we have collected literacy rates and measures of industrialization from the 
1911 Italian census (i.e. around the period of the enfranchisement) and interact them with Postt 
on the left-hand side of equation (6); the results are presented in Table 4. Controlling for literacy 
has little or no effect on the difference-in-differences between Northern and Southern regions, 
while it halves the estimated coefficient of interest when civicness is measured by the number of 
voluntary associations (columns 1 and 5, respectively); the same is true when we control for the 
level of industrialization, as measured by the number of firms and people employed in industry 
over total population (columns 2 and 6) or, alternatively, by per-capita energy consumption in 
each region (columns 3 and 7). However, the drop in the coefficient could be due to the fact that 
part of the effect of better civic traditions on voting turnout may go through higher human 
capital and economic development.
9 In any case, the estimated coefficient of civicness remains 
statistically significant, even when we control for all variables at the same time (columns 4 and 
8). 
5.2  Heterogeneity in enfranchisement rates 
The regional analysis conducted so far confirms that the reversal in voting turnout 
displayed in Figure 2 is statistically significant and robust to controlling for several other 
determinants of electoral participation. To provide a definite test of the model, we next relate 
changes in voting turnout to the fraction of newly enfranchised non-elite potential voters, i.e. the 
“treatment intensity” of enfranchisement, across electoral districts within the same area. 
In general, the size of elite (Eit) and non-elite groups (Nit) in each i-th district remains 
unobserved; the only thing that can be observed is total electorate, which equals the sum of the 
two groups in the elections after the enfranchisement (Tit=Eit+Nit) and the sole elite group 
before the enfranchisement of non-elites (Tit=Eit). Yet, Larcinese (2011) noticed that, narrowing 
the time window to the period between the last pre-enfranchisement (t-1=1909) and the first 
post-enfranchisement election (t=1913), the share of newly enfranchised non-elites nit can be 
approximated by the relative increase in the electorate between the two elections,  
 








   
                                                
 (6) 
 
9 Indeed, faster human capital accumulation is considered one of the main payoffs of higher social capital 
accumulation, see e.g. Knack and Keefer (1997). 
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it denoting the change in the number of elite individuals around the enfranchisement over 
the total post-enfranchisement electorate, (Eit - Eit-1)/Tit. As the latter term remains likely small 
for the few years between two consecutive elections, the growth of total electorate   provides a 
good approximation for the share of non-elite voters in the first post-enfranchisement election.  
*
it n
Figure 5 shows that the approximate share of non-elite voters across electoral districts 
displays substantial variation both within and between Northern and Southern regions; in 
particular, the distribution is concentrated around higher values in the latter group. On the one 
hand, this fact supports the results in Table 3 and Table 4 as a test of the theoretical prediction 
R1, namely that the elites vote more than the non-elites; in fact, (southern) regions characterized 
by a greater share of elite voters exhibited a stronger decrease in voting turnout after the 
enfranchisement. Omitted variation in the share of newly enfranchised voters, however, detracts 
from the credibility of the same estimates as a test of prediction R2, namely that civicness drives 
the differential response of voting turnout to the enfranchisement of non-elites. Lower treatment 
intensity rather than higher civicness could in fact explain the lower drop observed in northern 
regions. 
To reduce the scope for omitted variable bias, we augment the specification with the log 
number of people in the electorate in each region-election; after controlling for common time 
effects and other determinants of voting turnout, differences in enfranchisement rates across 
regions constitute the main source of within-region changes in the size of the electorate over the 
sample period. The results in Table 5 confirm that a greater expansion of the electorate is 
associated with an average decrease in voting turnout; still, the coefficients of interest are 
basically unaffected relative to the estimates reported in Table 3 and Table 4.  
While this additional evidence suggests that the differential effect between northern and 
southern regions is not entirely driven by heterogeneity in enfranchisement rates, as opposed to 
differences in civic traditions, it provides no clear answer about the role played by each of these 
two factors on the differential changes in voting turnout observed after the enfranchisement in 
northern and southern regions. To provide such an answer, we narrow the focus on changes 
between elections immediately before and after the enfranchisement and exploit variation at a 
finer level of geographical disaggregation.  
5.3  Non-elites and voting turnout 
Variation across electoral districts in enfranchisement rates and changes in voting turnout 
between 1909 and 1913 (the last pre-enfranchisement and the first post-enfranchisement 
election, respectively) provides an additional source of variation to identify the relationship 
between civicness and participation by the non-elites after the enfranchisement. To provide a 
precise test of the theoretical model, we take differences of equation (5) between elections in 
t=1913 and t-1=1909; noticing that nit-1=0 (as the non-elites were not allowed to vote before the 
enfranchisement) and plugging approximation (6) for nit we obtain the following estimating 
equation for within-district changes in voting turnout, 
   
*
1      –  it it r it it VV n         (7) 
 
18where νit = –Δπ(αr) it n ~ . Equation (7) thus allows us to identify the difference Δπ(αr) in the 
electoral participation of elites and non-elites exploiting variation across electoral district within 
the same area, which considerably reduces the scope for omitted variable bias. 
Figure 6 fits regression (7) across electoral districts within northern and southern regions. 
Consistently with prediction R1 of the theoretical model, both regression lines are negatively 
sloped; moreover, and in line with prediction R2, the slope is steeper within southern than 
within northern regions. These patterns mirror those in Figure 3 for individual voting and 
political participation by socio-economic status. 
The OLS estimates reported in Table 6 quantify these visual insights. According to the 
univariate regression in column (1), a one percentage point increase in the share of the non-elites 
in the electorate is associated with a 0.36 percentage points decrease in voting turnout; put 
differently, belonging to the non-elites lowers the probability of voting by one third. Notice also 
that the estimated intercept is positive, meaning that the observed drop in voting turnout after 
the enfranchisement is indeed attributable to the lower participation rates of non-elite masses, in 
the absence of which voting turnout would have followed the same upward trend as in the 
previous elections. 
Since equation (7) is estimated in first differences, it implicitly controls for all district-
specific factors that do not vary over time. However, we might also want to control for local 
shocks and other factors that impact differentially on voting turnout before and after the 
enfranchisement. As no economic and social characteristics are available at the district-level, we 
rather include a full set of regional fixed effects in the first-differenced equation, thus keeping 
constant all regional shocks and/or regional conditions that could affect the (asymmetric) 
response of voters to the enfranchisement. The coefficient of interest is only slightly reduced in 
absolute value (just below 0.3) and remains strongly statistically significant. 
As we split the sample and estimate the equation across electoral districts within each 
area, the effect is four times smaller in the civicness-rich northern regions than in the civicness-
poor southern regions (columns 3 and 4, respectively). The implied average effects of 
enfranchisement across districts in the two groups of regions, based on this simple specification, 
equals 2.3 and 12.8 percent, respectively, thus explaining most of the drop in voting turnout 
observed in northern and southern regions after the enfranchisement (see columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 3). The interaction coefficient in column (5) confirms that the difference in the slopes is 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level; an analogous result holds when interacting 
the share of non-elites with the other measure of civicness, namely the incidence of voluntarily 
associations. 
In the bottom part of Table 6 we examine to which extent the results depend on 
measurement error and/or the presence of influential observations, as the visual evidence in 
Figure 6  suggests that these might both be potential issues. In particular, in the middle panel we 
weight observations by the size of the electorate after the enfranchisement (between 8 and 43 
thousand individuals), while in the bottom panel we apply the data-driven algorithm devised by 
Huber (1964, 1981), which iteratively re-weight observations to downplay the importance of 
outliers. In both cases, the estimates are extremely similar to the OLS ones. 
 
19Overall, the results in Table 6 provide empirical support for the main predictions of the 
empirical model, namely that: the non-elites vote less than the elites; the difference in voting 
turnout between the two groups is greater the lower is the level of civicness; finally, and most 
importantly, such differences explain the reversal in voting turnout between northern and 
southern regions after the enfranchisement of the male population in 1912. We conclude this 
section by looking at the political consequences of the differential response of the non-elites to 
the extension of voting rights. 
5.4  Reallocation of political power 
The evidence so far is consistent with the view that for democratization to be successful it 
is required that non-élites are ready and willing to participate in the political process when the 
reform grants them voting power: but this willingness and readiness depends in turn on whether 
a culture of civicness is already diffuse. Lacking the latter, non-élites may fail to benefit from 
the new potential political influence leaving the distribution of powers unchanged and thus 
certifying a de facto failure of the democratization reform. To inquire this issue more directly 
we study how non-élites voted once they were granted democratic rights. Arguably, a 
democratization reform is successful if non-élites make an extensive use of these rights and if 
their votes are not captured by pre-existing élites but are used to strengthen their 
representativeness. That is, the reform is successful if it generates a substantial reallocation of 
political power away from élites.  
Socialist and communist parties represented the traditional political outlet of non-elite 
popular masses in Italy. Starting with the beginning of the 20
th century, they went to replace the 
so-called sinistra storica (“historical left”), which represented the progressive trends among the 
élites and dominated the political scene in Italy during the last quarter of the 19
th century. This 
process received undoubtedly an impulse after the enfranchisement of the non-elite masses. 
More precisely, after a slight increase in voting turnout at the first post enfranchisement 
elections, radical parties doubled their combined electoral share between 1913 and 1919, see 
Figure 7. This was made possible by the change in the electoral system, from majoritarian to 
proportional, which weakened the position of incumbent politicians to the advantage of younger 
political formations; it was also favored by the spread of radical political ideas among soldiers 
during World War I (Atlante Statistico Elettorale, 2009). 
Yet, the same graph shows that the political change was far from uniform. Radical parties 
gained in fact a significant political power (almost half of the votes in the last elections before 
the fascism) in Northern regions only, where the enfranchisement resulted into an effective 
increase in the political participation of the non-elites; by contrast, the electoral share of the 
same parties in southern regions remained always below 15%.    
These patterns are confirmed in Table 7, where we regress the voting share of socialist and 
communist parties on voting turnout. Since the emergence of such parties occurred mainly in the 
Biennio Rosso between 1919 and 1921 (the “Two Red Years”), we focus on regional data 
(available for all elections), as opposed to the district-level ones (which are not reported in the 
Atlante Statistico Elettorale for the period after 1913). While higher voting turnout is associated 
 
20with a greater electoral success of leftist parties throughout all the period (column 1), the 
relationship is much stronger after the enfranchisement (column 2). After controlling for region 
and election fixed effects, a differential percentage point increase in participation raises the 
electoral stake of radical parties by 0.3 percentage points on average, but by twice as much after 
the enfranchisement. One obvious interpretation of this finding is that increases in turnout after 
the enfranchisement were mainly driven by greater participation of the newly enfranchised non-
élite masses, which represented the major constituency of socialist and communist parties. 
These results are unaffected when we control for other correlates of the political support for 
such parties, namely union density and the incidence of workers’ strikes (columns 3 to 5). 
We finally compare these findings with those of Larcinese (2011), who also investigates 
the effect of the enfranchisement on the electoral support enjoyed by radical parties. Contrary to 
the results in the present paper, however, he finds that the extension of voting rights had little or 
no effect on the power of such parties. If anything, he finds actually a slight increase in southern 
regions only, in stark contrast with the picture that emerges from Figure 7. The explanation lies 
in the fact that, differently from our analysis, he considers the 1909-1913 elections only, in order 
to fully exploit district-level variation in the share of non-elite voters. In this way, however, he 
misses most of the variation in the electoral share of socialist and communist parties during the 
subsequent decade. For this reason, we chose instead to prolong the series through 1921 (even 
though at the cost of a lower geographical detail).   
5.5  The post-war period: political elections vs. popular referenda 
Overall, the results presented so far show that “de jure” concession of political rights 
taking place with the franchise resulted into a “de facto” re-allocation of political power only in 
the regions where non-elites were willing to actually exert those rights. One wonders whether 
this difference in civicness disappears over time as people voted repeatedly and possibly learned 
how to benefit from extended democratic rights. Put differently, did the 1912 extended franchise 
to the male population and the subsequent extension of voting rights to the whole population 
independently of gender after WWII bridge the gap in people civicness across regions of the 
country? After all, the main explanation that has been forward to explain why civicness differs 
so much between the North and the South of Italy is Putnam (1993) story. He was the first to 
argue that the civic capital divide between the North and the South of Italy aroused when history 
in these two parts of the country bifurcated around the turn of the first millennium. The North 
experienced for centuries a system of free cities that allowed its citizens to participate in the 
political process and to learn the benefits of democratic involvement which crystallized into 
people’s culture. The South instead ended up being dominated by highly hierarchical 
governments that never involved non-elites in political decisions and political management until 
Italy’s unification in 1861. Non-élites, the story goes, have thus internalized norms of 
dependence from élites and of non-involvement in the making of collective decisions. Have a 
century of democratic concessions and formal democratic rights bridged the civicness gap?  
One simple way to address this question is to compare the gap in participation in 
parliamentary elections between South and North since the 1912 franchise. The first national 
elections after the promulgation of the Constitution, held in 1948, were still characterized by a 
 
21higher voting turnout in Northern than in Southern regions; even though the difference between 
the two areas was initially relatively narrow, the gap widened considerably over the following 
60 years, see Figure 2. On this account, there seem to be no convergence in civicness.   
A possibly better way is to look at differences in participation in political elections and in 
referenda after WWII. Popular referenda – first introduced with 1946 republican constitution - 
differ from political elections because they call citizens to decide directly on subjects of public 
interest, such as divorce and abortion, public funding to political parties or reliance on nuclear 
power to produce energy. Referenda are often promoted by groups of citizen without any direct 
intermediation of members of political parties. Therefore, the opportunity for rent-seeking 
offered by participation in referenda should be absent (or at least much more limited) relative to 
political elections. Indeed, it is exactly for this reason that turnout in referenda (as opposed to 
national elections) has been traditionally used as a genuine measure of civic capital (see for 
instance Putnam, 1993; Guiso et al., 2004 and 2010b). Because of this, the difference in 
participation behavior between popular referenda and national elections provides also an 
alternative way to test the predictions of our theoretical framework.  
In terms of the simple model in (1)-(2), imposing R=0 in popular referenda for all 
individuals (including the élites), equation (5) implies that the difference in turnout between 
parliamentary elections (V
p) and referenda (V
r) should be  
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. (8) 
Therefore, from predictions R1 and R2 (equations 3 and 4, respectively) we expect the 
difference in (8) to be positive and greater in less civic regions. Hence, if the extension of voting 
rights started with the 1912 franchise and completed with the 1946 constitution has contributed 
to bridge the civicness gap we should find that the difference in participation between political 
elections and referenda that have taken place after WWII is similar in Southern  and in Northern 
regions. If instead democratic concessions did not contribute to the spread out of a civic culture, 
our model predicts a persistent and larger gap in the South between the two types of 
participation.      
 To test these predictions we assemble data on political elections and referenda in the 
postwar period. We use data on all the referenda that took place between 1974 and 1995 (see 
Table 7). The 1974 referenda on divorce was the first to take place after the 1946 referendum 
following the collapse of fascism for the choice between a constitutional monarchy and a 
republic. We choose to disregard this first referendum for two reasons: first, because 
participation was presumably affected by the intensity of the presence of the war across Italian 
regions and the differences that this triggered in people sentiments towards monarchy. Second, 
because looking at referenda that took place starting between 30 and 50 years after the 
formation of the democratic republic we allow for democratization to have had sometime to 
exert its effects on people’s civic culture. We exclude referenda that took place after 1995 
because, due to abuse of this institute, most these referenda did not achieve the quorum.
10 We 
 
10 More specifically, after 1995 it became common for the opposers of the proposals to boycott the ballot (rather 
than voting “NO”) in order to have the referendum missing the quorum. The referendum is not valid, in fact, unless 
 
22then compute the difference in participation in referenda and in the nearest parliamentary 
election across regions.    
Figure 8 shows the comparison between voting turnout in each referendum between 1974 
and 1995 with its closest national election; consistent with the prediction in (8), with one 
exception (Northern regions in the 1993 referendum) participation is always higher in national 
elections  and the difference is always greater in southern regions. Furthermore, the South-North 
gap in the participation premium between parliamentary elections and referenda is basically 
unchanged through the whole period. This last finding suggests that democratization per sè does 
not seem to have been able to affect people civic culture after half a century of exercise of 
voting rights and almost 20 opportunities to vote between 1975 and 1995, including municipal 
and European parliament elections.     
6.  Conclusions 
Using historical data on democratization and voting turnout in Italy we find that the 1912 
franchise led to a lower average participation in political elections but the decrease was much 
larger in the South than in the North to the point that a reversal emerged and the gap has since 
never been bridged. We interpret these results in the context of a simple model where 
participation in politics is driven both by a private motive for the potential benefit that 
involvement with power may give rise to and a social motive induced by pre-existing civic 
culture.       
These findings have two implications: first, a process of formal democratization through 
the concession of voting rights to a larger segment of the population is less likely to succeed and 
may indeed fail to work altogether if the beneficiaries of the new rights lack the civic culture 
necessary to practice these rights and translate them into effective political participation. 
Democratic reform supplies the potential for democratization, but its ultimate success rests on 
the existence of a demand for political participation based on the new voter’s actual willingness 
to use democratic rights: but to arise this demand requires a pre-existing civic culture, as argued 
long ago by Almond and Verba (1963).  The second point is that democratization seems also to 
fail to produce civic culture in such a way as to fill the gap between the two areas of the country: 
after decades of experimentation with democracy and repeated voting in local, national and 
European elections,  as well as in referenda, the gaps in political participation and in civic 
engagement between the North and the South remain unchanged. This raises one important 
question: can this lack of influence be consistent with the idea, first proposed by Putnam (1993) 
and supported by the evidence in Guiso et al. (2010), that the difference in civic values  between 
the North and the South reflects difference in exposure to democracy and familiarity with 
participation in the management of the public good that dates back to the experience of the free 
cities in the cities of the North? Why the free city experience of democratic engagement has  
                                                 
 
at least 50% of the electorate votes. By adopting this strategy, the supporters of “NO” may take advantage of some 
natural rate of abstention that is present in any election.  
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affected people civic culture while the concession of democratic rights did not? One possibility 
is that the free city experience lasted for about three centuries, much longer than the practice of 
universal suffrage after 1912. The latter may be too short to dismantle a culture of weak 
involvement which tends to be transmitted from generation to generation and, as such, shows 
persistence. A second explanation is that while the 1912 suffrage was a concession of an elite, 
perhaps to avoid bigger transfers of power under the threat of a socialist revolution (Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2000)), the emergence and invention of democratic participation in the free cities 
was the results of a big historical shocks – the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire and the 
disorder that followed – that required people’s direct involvement in the management of the 
public good. This would suggest that a civic culture – “a set of beliefs, attitudes, norms, 
perceptions and the like, that support participation" (Almond and Verba, p. 178) – is more likely 
to emerge when circumstances require that not only elites but the whole population or very large 
segments take responsibility in the solution of collective action problems. 
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27 Appendix: list of regional variables 
 
Dependent variables 
Voting Turnout: share of voters over total electorate in each region-election. Source: 
Atlante Storico Elettorale d’Italia (2009) 
Electoral support to socialist and communist parties: share of votes obtained by such 
parties over the total valid votes in each region-election. Source: Atlante Storico Elettorale 
d’Italia (2009) 
Explanatory variables 
North: indicator variable for northern and centre regions, which were not under the control 
of the Bourbons before the Unification. 
Post: indicator variable for elections held after the enfranchisement of 1912. 
Associations: number of voluntarily associations per 10,000 inhabitants in each region in 
year 1885. Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (1888) 
Literacy: percentage of people above 21 able to write and read in each region in year 
1911. Source: 1911 Census 
Firms: number of firms over total population in each region in year 1911. Source: 1911 
Census 
Employed in Industry: share of total population employed in industry in each region in 
year 1911. Source: 1911 Census 
Energy production: per-capita energy produced (in Kilowatt/hours) in each region in year 
1911. Source: 1911 Census 
Ln(Electorate): log of the total number of people in the electorate in each region-election. 
Source: Atlante Storico Elettorale d’Italia (2009) 
Union density: union members over total population in each region in year 1911. Source: 
1911 Census 
Strikes: number of workers involved in strikes over total population in each region in year 








Civic capital across regions in 1883, as measured by the diffusion of mutual aid societies 
 
Regions under the Bourbons before 1861
 
Notes: This figure shows the number of mutual aid societies over population across Italian regions in 1883. 
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Notes: This figure plots the voting turnout in northern and southern regions during all national 
elections held since the formation of the Italian state (1861). The vertical line 
corresponds to the change from restricted suffrage (on an income basis) to the 
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Notes: This figure plots the probability of voting (left graph) and of active participation in politics (right graph) for the 
sample of individuals interviewed in Italy during the 4
th wave of the World Values Survey (year 1999), by 
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voluntary associations x 10,000 inhabitants, 1885
Northern regions Southern regions
   
 Notes: This figure plots the number of voluntarily associations over population across Italian 





Approximate share of non-elites among the enfranchised, based on  
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share of non-elites in the electorate
Northern regions Southern regions
   
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the share of non-elite individuals in the electorate 
across electoral districts, based on the difference in the electorate between the last 
election before and the first election after the enfranchisement (years 1909 and 1913, 
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North, linear prediction South, linear prediction
 
 
Notes: This figure plots the change in voting turnout between the last pre-enfranchisement and 
the first post-enfranchisement election (years 1909 and 1913, respectively) against the 
approximate share of non-elite voters across electoral districts. The share of non-elite 
voters is estimated by the changes in the electorate between the two elections over the 
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Notes: This figure plots the fraction of voted obtained by socialist and communist parties 
in northern and southern regions during all national elections held from the 
formation of the Italian state (1861) to the advent of Fascism (1921). The vertical 
line corresponds to the change from restricted suffrage (on an income basis) to the 
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north south
 
Notes: This figure shows the difference between the voting turnout in national elections and popular 
referenda in northern and southern regions during the period 1974-1995 (the year on the 
horizontal axis correspond to the referendum year and the difference is taken with respect to the 





Linear probability model for voting behavior 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5) 
 All  regions    North  South  All 
Medium-Low  Class  0.011  -0.032  -0.061  0.046  0.035 
 (0.035)  (0.042)    (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.048) 
Medium-High Class  0.102**  0.040    0.026  0.081  0.067 
 (0.035)  (0.037)    (0.040)  (0.060)  (0.055) 
Upper Class  0.120*** 0.072*    0.035  0.192**  0.163***
 (0.038)  (0.042)    (0.043)  (0.068)  (0.055) 
North -0.009           
 (0.017)           
North x Medium-Low Class            -0.110 
           (0.073) 
North x Medium-High 
Class           -0.053 
           (0.066) 
North x Upper Class            -0.140* 
           (0.070) 
Constant 0.800*** 0.479**   0.189  1.140***  0.501** 
 (0.031)  (0.178)    (0.237)  (0.231)  (0.188) 
            
R
2 0.021  0.049    0.075  0.083  0.053 
 
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of a linear probability model of political participation. The unit of 
analysis are answers to the World Values Survey for the sample of (up to) 1,304 Italian individuals 
interviewed during the 4
th wave of the survey (year 1999). The dependent variables is an indicator 
variable for the intention to vote in the next political election. The explanatory variables of main 
interest are a set of categorical indicators for socio-economic status (4 categories) as well as their 
interaction with an indicator variable for Northern regions. All specifications include a quadratic 
polynomial in age, gender and categorical variables for number of children and size of the town of 
residence, as well as categorical indicators of preferences for democracy whenever indicated 
(“Additional individual controls”). The table reports whether the regression includes also region fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors clustered by region are reported in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote 




Linear probability model for direct participation into politics 
 All  regions    North  South  All 
Medium-Low Class  0.006  0.033*    0.013  0.046  0.060* 
  (0.017) (0.019)  (0.027) (0.025) (0.031) 
Medium-High Class  0.031*  0.062**   0.038  0.094**  0.085** 
  (0.015) (0.022)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.030) 
Upper Class  0.043** 0.045    0.001  0.116*  0.120***
  (0.021) (0.027)  (0.036) (0.052) (0.039) 
North 0.011           
 (0.014)           
North x Medium-Low Class           -0.050 
          (0.041) 
North x Medium-High 
Class          -0.045 
          (0.040) 
North x Upper Class            -0.115**
          (0.050) 
Constant 0.030*  0.188*    0.135  0.194  0.203* 
  (0.016) (0.093)  (0.081) (0.139) (0.097) 
          
N. Observations  1,304  1,049    712  337  1,049 
Region  FE  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Additional individual 
controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
R
2  0.005 0.080    0.091 0.149 0.084 
 
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of a linear probability model of political participation. The 
unit of analysis are answers to the World Values Survey for the sample of (up to) 1,304 Italian 
individuals interviewed during the 4
th wave of the survey (year 1999). The dependent 
variables is an indicator variable for active involvement in politics, as measured by 
appointment in office or active membership in some political party (bottom panel). The 
explanatory variables of main interest are a set of categorical indicators for socio-economic 
status (4 categories) as well as their interaction with an indicator variable for Northern 
regions. All specifications include a quadratic polynomial in age, gender and categorical 
variables for number of children and size of the town of residence, as well as categorical 
indicators of preferences for democracy whenever indicated (“Additional individual 
controls”). The table reports whether the regression includes also region fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors clustered by region are reported in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote 




Voting turnout before and after the enfranchisement 
 
  (1)  (2)    (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          











0.209***     
  (0.014)  (0.016)    (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016)      




*   
          (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.020)     
North x Trend             
0.002**
*    
              (0.000)     





                (0.023)  (0.029) 
Associations  x  Trend              0.002** 
                (0.001) 
                
Observation
s  340  340    207 133  340 340 340 322 322 
Region FE   YES  YES    YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Trend  NO YES    YES  YES  YES NO NO NO NO 
Year  FE  NO  NO    NO  NO  NO  YES YES YES YES 
R
2 0.383  0.429    0.259  0.624  0.580 0.693 0.708 0.634 0.644 
                
 
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS estimates of the differential effect of the enfranchisement of 1912 on 
voting turnout across Italian regions. The unit of analysis are region-election observations for 18 Italian regions 
over 19 national elections during the period 1861-1921 (2 regions did not vote in the first election in 1861). The 
dependent variable is the fraction of people that voted in each region-election. The main explanatory variables are 
the indicator variable Post, which is equal to 1 for all elections held after the enfranchisement and 0 otherwise, 
and two alternative measures of civicness: an indicator variable for regions in the north, which were not under the 
control of Bourbons before 1861, and the number of voluntarily associations per 10,000 inhabitants in 1885 (this 
last measure is not available for 1 region in the sample). The bottom part of the table indicates whether the 
regression includes in addition a linear trend or region and election fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90%, 95% and 





Voting turnout in northern and southern regions, before and after the enfranchisement 
(robustness) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
North x Post  0.173***  0.146*** 0.159*** 0.160***        
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026)         
Associations  x  Post      0.084*** 0.085***  0.103***  0.053**
       (0.030)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Literacy  x  Post  -0.001     0.001  0.004***    0.002**
  (0.001)    (0.001)  (0.001)      (0.001) 
Firms x Post    14.537    11.036    26.560*    25.760 
   (10.391)  (11.913)  (14.908)  (15.845)
Employed in Industry x Post    0.576    0.909*    1.016*    0.186 
   (0.386)  (0.519)  (0.518)  (0.628) 
Energy production x Post      0.727**  -0.022      1.496***  0.513 
     (0.313)  (0.279)     (0.335)  (0.328) 
          
Observations  340 340 340 340 322 322 322 322 
Region  FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Election  FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R
2  0.694 0.705 0.699 0.706 0.660 0.679 0.663 0.685 
          
 
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS estimates of the differential effect of the enfranchisement of 
1912 on voting turnout across Italian regions. The unit of analysis are region-election observations 
for 18 Italian regions over 19 national elections during the period 1861-1921 (2 regions did not vote 
in the first election in 1861). The dependent variable is the fraction of people that voted in each 
region-election. The main explanatory variables are the indicator variable Post, which is equal to 1 
for all elections held after the enfranchisement and 0 otherwise, and two alternative measures of 
civicness: an indicator variable for regions in the north, which were not under the control of 
Bourbons before 1861, and the number of voluntarily associations per 10,000 inhabitants in 1885 
(this last measure is not available for 1 region in the sample). Additional controls include 
interactions of Post with literacy rates, firms over total population, workers in industry over total 
population and per-capita energy consumption; the source of all these variables is the Italian census 
of 1911, the detailed description is reported in the Appendix. The bottom part of the table indicates 
whether the regression includes in addition a linear trend or region and election fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote coefficients significantly different 
from zero at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively. 
 
 
42Table 5  
 
 
Voting turnout before and after the enfranchisement, controlling 
for changes in the electorate 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
North x Post  0.188*** 0.183*** 0.160***      
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.027)       
Associations x Post        0.171*** 0.175***  0.062**
       (0.023)  (0.030)  (0.028) 
ln(Electorate)  
-





   (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
        
Observations  340 338 338 322 320 320 
Region  FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year  FE  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Additional  controls  NO NO  YES  NO NO  YES 
R
2  0.693 0.701 0.711 0.634 0.648 0.692 
        
 
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS estimates of the difference-in-differences effect of 
civicness on voting turnout, before and after the enfranchisement of 1912. The unit of analysis 
are region-election observations for 18 Italian regions over 19 national elections during the 
period 1861-1921 (2 regions did not vote in the first election in 1861). The dependent variable 
is the fraction of people that voted in each region-election. The explanatory variables of main 
interest are the interaction  between the indicator variable Post, which is equal to 1 for all 
elections held after the enfranchisement and 0 otherwise, and two alternative measures of 
civicness: an indicator variable for regions in the north, which were not under the control of 
Bourbons before 1861, and the number of voluntarily associations per 10,000 inhabitants in 
1885 (this last measure is not available for 1 region in the sample). The control variable 
ln(Electorate) is the log-number of people in the electorate in each election-region. All 
regressions include region and election fixed effects; the bottom part of the table indicates 
whether the additional controls in Table 4 are also included (interactions of Post with literacy 
rates, firms over total population, workers in industry over total population and per-capita 
energy consumption). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote 




Share of non-elites and change in turnout around the enfranchisement, across electoral 
districts 
 (1)  (2)    (3) (4)    (5) (6) 
A. Ordinary least squares regression 
  All regions    North  South    All regions 
Non-elites   -0.364*** -0.286***    -0.185** -0.821***    -0.821*** -0.611*** 
 (0.048)  (0.078)    (0.079) (0.118)   (0.117) (0.181) 
North x Non-elites            0.006***  
            (0.001)  
Associations x Non-elites          0.003** 
             (0.002) 
Constant  0.176*** 0.139***    0.089** 0.483***    0.089** 0.047 
 (0.033)  (0.041)    (0.041) (0.089)   (0.041) (0.058) 
              
R
2  0.103 0.161    0.109 0.248    0.181 0.163 
 
B. Weighted least squares regression 
              
Non-elites   -0.364*** -0.292***    -0.205** -0.813***    -0.813*** -0.635*** 
 (0.051)  (0.081)    (0.085) (0.132)   (0.132) (0.190) 
North x Non-elites            0.006***  
            (0.002)  
Associations x Non-elites          0.003* 
             (0.002) 
Constant  0.173*** 0.138***    0.095** 0.476***    0.095** 0.049 
 (0.035)  (0.043)    (0.044) (0.099)   (0.044) (0.060) 
              
R
2  0.097 0.155    0.108 0.225    0.171 0.156 
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 (1)  (2)    (3) (4)    (5) (6) 
 
C. Huber-White robust regression 
  All regions    North South   All regions 
Non-elites   -0.369***  -0.296***    -0.207** -0.804***    -0.806*** -0.624*** 
 (0.046)  (0.067)    (0.081) (0.141)   (0.168) (0.163) 
North x Non-elites             0.006***  
            (0.002)  
Associations x Non-elites            0.003** 
             (0.002) 
Constant 0.178***  0.136***    0.093** 0.478***    0.094** 0.051 
 (0.031)  (0.037)    (0.044) (0.109)   (0.039) (0.064) 
              
Observations 496  496    312 184    496 487 
Region FE (region-specific shocks)  NO  YES    YES YES    YES YES 
R
2 0.115  0.178    0.131 0.230    0.198 0.174 
              
 
Notes: This table presents estimates of the relationship between the share of non-elite voters and the change in 
voting turnout before and after Italy’s 1912 enfranchisement across electoral districts, distinguishing between 
Northern and Southern regions. Dependent variable: change in voting turnout between the last pre-
enfranchisement and the first post-enfranchisement election (years 1909 and 1913, respectively). Main 
explanatory variable: share of non-elite voters in each electoral district, estimated by the change in the 
electorate between the two elections over the total electorate in 1913, and its interaction with two alternative 
measures of civicness: an indicator for Northern regions that were not under the control of the Bourbons 
before 1861, and the number of voluntarily associations per 10,000 inhabitants in 1885 (this last measure is 
not available for 1 region in the sample). Panel A: OLS estimates; Panel B: weighed least squares, weights 
are the size of electoral districts in 1913: Panel C: Huber-White robust estimates. The bottom part of table 
indicates whether the regression includes in addition a linear trend or region and election fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote coefficients significance at the 90%, 





Electoral support to socialist and communist parties in northern and southern regions, 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Voting turnout  0.436*** 0.299*** 0.296*** 0.294***  0.294***
  (0.071) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
Voting turnout  x Post  0.631*** 0.586**  0.568**  0.610** 
    (0.234) (0.262) (0.249) (0.263) 
Union density x Post    0.305    -1.276 
     (0.841)  (1.529) 
Strikes x Post      0.813  2.716 
      (1.318)  (2.304) 
       
Observations  340 340 340 340 340 
Region  FE  YES YES YES YES YES 
Year  FE  YES YES YES YES YES 
R
2  0.678 0.687 0.687 0.688 0.689 
       
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates of the relationship between voting turnout and the electoral 
results of socialist and communist parties. The unit of analysis are region-election 
observations for 18 Italian regions over 19 national elections during the period 1861-1921 (2 
regions did not vote in the first election in 1861). The dependent variable is the fraction of 
valid voted in favor of socialist and communist parties in each region-election. The main 
explanatory variable is the voting turnout in each region-election, possibly interacted with the 
indicator variable Post, which is equal to 1 for all elections held after the enfranchisement and 
0 otherwise. Additional controls include interactions of Post with union density and 
participation into workers’ strikes over total population; the source of these variables is the 
Italian census of 1911, the detailed description is reported in the Appendix. The bottom part 
of the table indicates whether the regression includes in addition a linear trend or region and 
election fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote 


















Public funding to political parties, public order and 
safety 
1978 1979 
Public funding to political parties, public order and 
safety 
1981 1979 
Abortion,  public order and safety, life sentence 




Liability of judges, nuclear power and financing of 
local authorities 
1989 1987 




10 proposals on public health, electoral reform and 
organization of Ministries 
1995 1994 
12 proposals on the reform of labor relations, 
public television and electoral law for local 
elections  
  
Notes: This table shows the list of referenda and nearest parliamentary elections that we use in to compute 
differences in turnout across regions, as shown in Figure 6.  We exclude the constitutional referenda in 
1946 as participation was strongly affected by difference in preferences between monarchy and 
republic between the South and the North and all the referenda that took place after 1995 as many did 
not reach the quorum.   
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